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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I identify two sets of practical values of argumentation from a standpoint
that places a premium on maximal participatory democracy. The first set includes pedagogical values
for both teachers and learners. The second set of values are transformative and include: facilitating
openness as both tolerance and opportunity; facilitating understanding of one’s own positions,
other’s positions, and the conceptual frameworks underlying them; and, finally, fostering motivation
by encouraging action.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Like any other theoretical or practical view, argumentation theory is preconditioned
by various structural assumptions, commitments, and values, whether these are
made explicit or even recognized by the theorist herself (Warren, 1988; Haraway,
2004; Nagel, 1986; Gadamer, 1989; Hamblin, 1970, pp. 242-244). Although, of
course, when they are not, it can be tricky to identify what exactly those
assumptions are. In this paper, I work from a standpoint valuing maximal
participatory democracy to argue for two sets of practical values of argumentation
theory and practice; namely, pedagogical and transformative values. I shall begin by
situating my approach within a maximally democratic framework and identifying an
obligation to try to reason and/or argue better that might help us appreciate
argumentation that engenders values important for maximal participatory
democracy.
2. SITUATING MY APPROACH
I begin the task of identifying some practical values of argumentation from a
standpoint valuing maximal participatory democracy. This means I share in
common with Paul J. Weithman (2000) the assumption that “‘democratic’ is a degree
concept and that political processes can be more or less democratic” (p. 67). The
extent of a democracy’s “democracy” depends on the manner by which it
demonstrates and combines “democracy-conducing features” (ibid.). Whatever this
set of features might be, I believe that it would, at the very least, include some
minimal degree of collective decision-making under what Trudy Govier (1999) calls
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-11.
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conditions of uncertainty. The viewpoints stemming from this uncertainty should be
viewed in contradistinction to abstract independent standards of political judgment.
In most cases, the genealogy of a given political viewpoint is, at its core, a
collaborative effort. And attempts to bracket out the contingencies therein by
ontologizing one’s beliefs (and values) as indefeasible cannot operate and have no
home within a democratic framework valuing maximum participation. In short, we
can say that claims or projects that offer “value-neutral, ahistorical, or
noncontextual objectivity” (Warren, 1988, p. 39) would be incompatible with a
maximally democratic framework.
For her part, however, Govier simply takes democracy to mean a society filled
with disagreements that affect all citizens and must be explored and resolved
reasonably without appeals to deductive certainty. Of course, I agree with Govier on
this point. But I further believe that a maximally democratic society could be
described in Van Parijs’ terms as a “society that subjects everything to collective
decision-making and gives each of its members an equal power in the decision it
takes” (as cited in Howard, 2002, p. 28). Thus “maximally democratic” also means
“maximally participatory.” This view assumes that maximum participation is a good
thing. A maximal participatory democracy is, however, presented here as an ideal.
Although I am not suggesting any concrete ways to move society closer to it, I will
identify a variety of practical values of argumentation that can be supplemented for
varying degrees of participatory democracies. If I am right, this undertaking carries
with it potential to direct us toward and make explicit the more transformative
powers of argumentation theory.
With these preliminary insights in mind, I now turn to the task of identifying the
practical values of argumentation. My point of departure for doing this entails a
reinterpretation of J. Anthony Blair’s (1981) thesis that we have a moral obligation
to try to reason well. This will help clarify later on what exactly I take to be the
practical values of argumentation, and why we ought to engage in and appreciate
argumentation that facilitates these values.
3. THE OBLIGATION TO TRY TO REASON AND/OR ARGUE BETTER (AND MORE
OFTEN)
Blair (2012a) claims that for moral reasons we all ought to, pro tanto, try to conduct
ourselves reasonably, and as often as possible.1 Stated more formally, his argument
runs as follows:
P1: If in general we have a moral obligation to [try to] do something, then we have a
moral obligation to [try to] do whatever else is necessary in order to do the first
thing. If we have moral reasons to realize the end, then we have moral reasons to
realize the necessary means to that end.
P2: We have a moral obligation to [try to] avoid false beliefs and to pursue true
beliefs.
Blair (2012c) says in a postscript that he should “more consistently have written of the obligation to
try to reason well,” because “it is too morally demanding” otherwise (p. 33). I have thus added “try
to” to the phrasing of the obligation.
1
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P3: Being able to reason well is necessary as a means of ascertaining true and false
beliefs.
C: We have a moral obligation to [try to] reason well. (p. 7)

At the time this article was written, Blair took “argumentation skills as more
or less identical to skills in critical thinking” (2012c, p. 2). However, Blair has since
argued that informal logic—which focuses on “teaching the analysis and critique of
arguments” by teaching “methods of argument analysis and evaluation other than
formal logic”—cannot be taken as equivalent with critical thinking, because it is
“one aspect of the theory and practice of argument management; and argument
management is one element of critical thinking” (2012b, p. 50). Consequently, some
of the skills involved in reasoning well seem to, at least in part, be involved in and
can possibly be developed through argumentation.
Now, Blair’s (2012a) second premise expresses the basic assumption that
beliefs can be true or false. On this view, reasoning poorly might mean attaining
false beliefs (and potentially risking harm to others) while reasoning well means
attaining true ones (and benefiting ourselves and others) (p. 8). If, however, we view
the matter from a standpoint that appreciates maximal participatory democracy as
described above, then our treatment of truth with respect to political life (and the
uncertainties therein) might be different too. We may place a premium on the
movement to better beliefs from worse ones, rather than in the dichotomous lens of
either true or false. I prefer this for practical reasons: maximal participation is more
effective if we can appeal to what we find best to believe in given particular
circumstances rather than appealing to the truth and shutting down the
communicative process. From this basis, I contend that we can understand the
obligation differently; namely, as a moral obligation to try to reason and/or argue
better (and to do so more often).
There are other reasons for why we have an obligation to try to reason
and/or argue better. The first is socio-political. Our lives, for the most part, are
media saturated and occur within inescapably social contexts at the ontological
level. At our core, we are what Johnson and Blair (2006) call “consumers of beliefs of
values” who are always encountering new information and the beliefs of others, and
many of these are different from or conflict with our own (pp. 1; xi).
Moreover, our lives occur as fundamentally social. For this reason, our
consumption of beliefs and values through the statements and arguments of others
should be viewed as an active process, which, based on Tindale’s (2004; 2009) view,
we can potentially engage in to varying degrees. To this end, Tindale posits that “[i]t
seems a fundamental feature of our social beings that we are ‘in audience’” (2009).
“We always have the standpoint of an audience,” he continues,
of what the experience of an audience feels like; this is our primary relationship to
argumentation, our entry into it. Individually, and in the groups to which we belong
or to which speakers assume we belong, we have this potential. We are constantly
open to being addressed. We are able to learn to be arguers, to engage in
argumentation from this perspective, because we have first been audiences, and
engaged from that perspective. Thus, audience as a way of being is fundamental to
argumentation as a social phenomenon. (p. 47)
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‘Being in audience,’ then, is an essential aspect of our being in the world, and we can
always “have the perspective of an audience and hence understand what it can mean
to be addressed by any particular discourse,” even if we are not part of an arguer’s
intended audience (2004, p. 152). A simple example should suffice to make this
point clear: today we have access to historical texts of authors who wrote so long
ago that they could not have anticipated (to any meaningful extent) the sort of
horizons of meaning that various twenty-first century readers would have upon
encountering their texts, but—and this important—we can nonetheless appreciate
those texts from an audience’s perspective.
This experience of being in audience, says Tindale (2009), is in part captured
by Bakhtin’s notion of ‘addressivity,’ which
refers to the ways in which words used in utterances, in their very structure, both
address and anticipate a response. Utterances are not isolated components of
discourse, woven together to form a coherent whole; they are essentially dialogical
in nature, the utterance captures both the utterer and the audience insofar as the
audience’s expectations, interpretation and response condition the development of
the utterance and ensuing speech. Transferring this understanding of utterance to
the genre of argumentation, we must see this dialogical character fixing the
audience as a primary contributory source of the argumentation… Understanding
any argumentation, including the intentions involved, must begin as much with the
audience as the arguer. (pp. 47-48)

For Bakhtin and Tindale, then, context is necessarily central to argumentation (in
terms of both its construction and evaluation), so are the arguer and her arguments,
as well as the audience and its responses.
As a result, dialogism emerges as a central feature of this conception of
argumentation with respect to argument, evaluation and acceptance. Since
arguments are co-developed as arguers compensate for the “expectations,
interpretation, and responses” of audiences, the sorts of objections considered and
the requisite responses offered by arguers are determined by the ever present
demands of context, which, above all, fundamentally includes the audience and its
perspective (and the horizon of meaning underlying that perspective) on the matter
at hand.2 Thus, with Tindale, we see that our fundamental way of being is such that
Govier’s (1999) so-called “Noninteractive Audience” is incompatible with the idea of an active
audience as part of the context of argumentation. She conceptualizes the noninteractive audience as
“the [massive] audience that can’t interact with the arguer, and whose [most likely heterogeneous]
views are not known to him or her” (p. 183), for example, “the audience for many arguments
presented in the mass media” (p. 189). When dealing with the view that there are cases where mass
audiences can “talk back,” Govier firmly holds that the audience “cannot respond while the argument
is being developed, so their challenges and questions of meaning do not affect the final product” (p.
200n13).
While I might be accused of taking Govier too literally here, her description of an argument as a static
“product”—with emphasis on the finality of its completion—reveals and effectively captures the
difference between her and Tindale’s (2004) understanding of the active audience located in a
rhetorical approach to argumentation, which, for his part, treats argument as a process. So to use
Govier’s Noninteractive Audience to undercut the notion of addressivity would be rather dubious
because, quite frankly, Govier and Tindale are talking about argument in two completely different
ways. When treated as a process, arguments can evolve and adapt to changing information about the
2
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we always already have the potential to engage in reasoning and argumentation.
And I add that if we are to continue living with each other, we then need to reason
and argue better.
Moreover, when it comes to judging someone as reasoning well/badly, the
way of reasoning is not inherently erroneous. According to Douglas Walton (1995), a
particular sort of reasoning might be okay given certain contexts (pp. 14-18).
Reasoning is contextual and judgments of an argument’s goodness are dependent on
(relevant) context. Let us consider this observation in conjunction with another:
Even when we brush aside beliefs or views we encounter but do not care enough to
think about at all, we tacitly endorse them. This seemingly passive acceptance is
actually a bare minimum of actively reasoning: we can’t help but reason to some
extent. Given this, and since the quality of arguments are context dependent, we can
reason differently than we have before, or how we are inclined to do so. We can,
then, understand reasoning in terms of better or worse (on a scale of varying
degrees of better and worse). And insofar as arguing is an activity we can
understand them in terms of better or worse as well.
What this amounts to, at the very least, is that we’re responsible for how well
we reason and we’re accountable to others who can challenge us when we express
our beliefs. Whether we like it or not, we are confronted with information that
needs to be adequately dealt with, and in light of rejecting the essentialist qualities
of arguments (i.e., their inherent goodness or badness), we can say that we are
responsible for trying to reason and/or argue well (understood as better); as such,
we ought to try to do this.
I will now turn to the task of identifying possible pedagogical and
transformative values of argumentation that might help us with trying to reason
and/or argue better.
4. PRACTICAL VALUES OF ARGUMENTATION
4.1 Pedagogical values
Argumentation can be practically valuable for the teaching and learning of
argumentation evaluation and construction, as well as cultivating the various critical
thinking skills and dispositions associated with these. And, based on what was
established in the previous section, I submit that learning is especially valuable
when these skills and dispositions are taught in a dialogical manner.
To this end, let us return to Blair (2012) and unpack what he identifies as an
obligation for teachers of reasoning and argumentation to acquire, which includes
“as sound an understanding of reasoning and argument as possible” (p. 2) as it
follows from the foregoing obligation to try to reason well. In doing so, we can
views and values (or cognitive environment) of the audience, as well as the surrounding details of
why the audience does or does not accept the argument regardless of whether overt engagement in
dialogue (in the colloquial sense of the term) has occurred. The scope of a “process argument” is not
as narrowly circumscribed as the scope of a “product argument,” which would seem on Govier’s view
to be complete once it has left the hands of the arguer and is taken up by the mass audience.
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bracket his uncontroversial claim that teachers of reasoning and argument ought to
be knowledgeable. My concern, however, is that in striving to acquire “as sound an
understanding as possible” teachers run the risk of attaining too narrow a view of
reasoning and argument. By this I mean that mining information for the sole
purpose of building a grand view about reasoning and argument could put one at
risk for developing a monological lens and a correspondingly myopic approach to
the topics at issue.
We should recognize that attaining “as sound an understanding as possible”
admits of many different pedagogical approaches and should include learning from
the students that one teaches. Teaching good argumentation and reasoning skills
should not amount to Freire’s (1970) oft-cited “banking concept of education,”
which consists of “an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories
and the teacher is the depositor” (p. 72). Naturally this pedagogical approach would
be far too monological for our liking. I do not mean to suggest that this is what Blair
implies with his claim. I am simply offering a word of caution and want to
emphasize that there is a certain quality of argumentation that is most valuable with
respect to engaging students in the evaluation and construction of argumentation.
A dialogical style of teaching and learning can go a long way toward
facilitating an understanding of oneself, others, better ways of being sensitive to the
context of argumentation, and, as a result, the evaluation and construction of
argumentation, and point to how these aspects are best learned and taught. Indeed,
through a dialogical and cooperative teaching style teachers and learners can better
develop what Warren (1988) identifies as important outcomes of teaching and
learning, namely that “teacher’s/learner’s…eventually come to recognize their own
conceptual frameworks, see alternative conceptual frameworks, and where
possible, conduct discussions across conceptual frameworks” (p. 40). These are
helpful character-building practices that educators should try to engage in better
and naturally find a home in dialogical argumentation theory.
The pedagogical values examined so far may seem like nothing more than
values of argumentation practice. But the practices developed and promoted
through theory are not isolated from that theory in a way that make it any less
valuable than the practices themselves. More specifically, there is, for example, great
value to taking a meta-view toward the practice of argumentation by understanding
the theory supporting the practice. A teacher’s understanding of the constitutive
components of a dialogical argumentation theory, or simply the rationale
underpinning dialogism, could no doubt contribute to her understanding and
appreciation of the practice in a way that enhances the quality of her teaching and
the skills involved, all the while fostering an appreciation for these practices in her
students. Furthermore, dialogical teaching styles can aid teachers and learners alike
in developing the dispositions involved in reasoning and arguing better. In short,
argumentation theory is most valuable when it is involved in the process of
promoting dialogism inside and outside of the classroom.
4.2. Transformative values
The next set of practical values to explore is the “transformative,” which include (1)
6
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openness (understood in terms of both tolerance and opportunity), (2)
understanding, and (3) motivation. Values (2) and (3) presuppose openness. Taken
together, these values are understood as transformative in the sense that they serve
as a precondition for social change.
I understand openness in two senses. In the first sense, openness is tolerance
of other views and differently minded people from the perspective of oneself and
likeminded individuals. In the second sense, the experience of openness is
opportunity for engagement in discourse from the perspective of the Other. These
two senses are not so clearly demarcated so as to exclude the possibility that at one
and the same time I can be open in the sense of tolerating other viewpoints while
also experiencing the opportunity to engage in dialogical argumentation.
My understanding of tolerance follows Warren’s (1988) definition: “being
receptive (‘open’) to points of view different than one’s own on a given topic or
issue” (p. 37). “It is difficult,” she says, “if not impossible to consider seriously other
points of view than one’s own if one is not aware that there are other points of
views” (ibid.). In other words, ignorance begets ignorance. I take this claim to be
relatively uncontroversial but useful for illustrating the benefits of tolerance.
Now, tolerance of viewpoints that conflict with one’s own, or those of one’s
society, plant the seeds for social transformation. No doubt there is always
resistance and conflict to different viewpoints, and this is not to say that status quo
views necessarily require change. Rather, an attitude of tolerance for other voices
(and otherwise muted voices) provides us with valuable content to learn and even
deliberate about. If, however, we believe that society should value uniformity and so
close our collective mind off from different and even subversive voices, we risk
forcing others to, for example, remain quiet about their suffering if they are
suffering—and even whether or not we would come to find their claims for
attention, understanding and/or action legitimate. A few choice words by Richard
Rorty (1991) help describe the more salient aspects of this phenomenon. We are
contingent on our acculturation, which
is what makes certain options live, or momentous, or forced, while leaving others
dead, or trivial, or optional. We can only hope to transcend our acculturation if our
culture contains (or thanks to disruptions from outside or internal revolt, comes to
contain) splits which supply toeholds for new initiatives. Without such splits—
without tensions which make people listen to unfamiliar ideas in the hope of finding
means of overcoming those tensions—there is no such hope…So our best chance for
transcending our acculturation is to be brought up in a culture which prides itself on
not being monolithic—on its tolerance for a plurality of subcultures and its
willingness to listen to neighbouring cultures. (pp. 13-14)

To put the matter in Kantian parlance: tolerance preconditions the possibility for
meaningful and maximally democratic change.
However, tolerance is not without its limits. As Carl Sagan (1996) memorably
put it, “[k]eeping an open mind is a virtue—but…not so open that your brains spill
out” (p. 187).3 To this end, Warren (1988) has some worthwhile advice to offer us:
3

Sagan (1996) credits this quip to space engineer James Oberg (p. 187).
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“[T]he extent of one’s willingness and ability to be openminded about issues is,” she
says, “significantly affected by the conceptual framework out of which it operates.
Openmindedness is a disposition that persons do or do not exercise within a given
conceptual framework. This is the essentially contextual nature of openmindedness:
it is always exercised from within a (some) conceptual framework” wherein “certain
positions, claims or points of view may be viewed as undeserving of serious and
equal consideration” [author’s emphasis, et passim] (pp. 37-38). Warren’s
justification for these claims will become clearer once we investigate her distinction
between two types of bias.
Warren distinguishes between bias that generally manifests within a
particular conceptual framework through false claims or “conceptually flawed
distinctions,” and bias in the sense of inescapable partiality, a feature of any putative
conceptual framework (p. 39). As a result of bias in the latter sense, “claims from
within a given conceptual framework [are] resistant to certain new evidence
(especially logically incompatible evidence)” (ibid.). This is not, however, indicative
of closed-mindedness per se. A conceptual framework with the latter sense of bias
will find certain claims to be “logically incompatible with the basic and defining
assumptions of the…conceptual framework, and so cannot consistently be added to
it” (p. 38). For instance, any claim to the innate inferiority of women to men—a
claim that “makes sense” within a patriarchal framework—is logically inconsistent
with the most basic assumptions of a feminist conceptual framework, which cannot
tolerate the claim at all.4
Not all biases are bad nor are they created equal. For example, the “facts” of a
patriarchal conceptual framework are established on the basis of not taking into
account what the feminist one does. More clearly, certain underlying beliefs and
assumptions on the patriarchal framework are not shared by the feminist
framework, because the latter has a meta-position whereby it can evaluate and
challenge the assumptions and beliefs of the patriarchal framework instead of just
assuming them. Such a framework precludes uncritically accepted assumptions of
the patriarchal framework from becoming structural features of it. And,
consequently, at work in the feminist framework is “a better bias…because it is more
inclusive [that is, tolerant of other’s realities] and less partial” than the patriarchal
framework, which “is more partial because less inclusive” (pp. 38-39).
In addition to tolerance, I understand “openness” in terms of opportunity.
Opportunity constitutes the experience of the tolerated individual(s) entering into
dialogue with those tolerating her/them. But with respect to argumentation, the
tolerated individual(s) may enter as either the arguer or the audience. Someone
whose otherwise muted voice was tolerated by others, for example, can then
The discussion of tolerance suggests that we can (and it is important to) escape the influence of our
basic assumptions. Of course, this may seem strange since these assumptions have been described
earlier as the lenses through which information and our experiences make sense. Toleration of other
points of view may be precluded by certain conceptual frameworks, but this does not necessarily
mean that the subjects of those frameworks cannot develop different, better frameworks. Some
avenues to explore for how this might be accomplished include Warren’s suggestion of “revolution”
over “reform” (1988, p. 36), and Gadamer’s (1989) idea of the “fusion of horizons” of meaning.
4
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become visible as an arguer. So an argumentation theory that can facilitate tolerance
as understood above is practically valuable for helping to make it possible for
individuals who would otherwise be closed off from dialogue to have an opportunity
to enter into it.
While tolerance can help individuals achieve participatory status as arguers,
it can also help them achieve the status of active audience members. But this claim
needs to be qualified further, for as we saw above, a fundamental feature of our
existence is that we can always already take the perspective of audience. For this
reason, what amounts to “achieving the status of active audience members” is that
the role of those individuals as an active audience matters and is, in turn, broadened
in scope. In other words, they can have greater opportunity to engage in the dialogic
process of argumentation. Thus engaging in argumentation requires us to broaden
the scope of our discussions by acknowledging that suppressed viewpoints should
be heard and could be catalysts for transformative and substantive change (sociopolitically speaking).
The next transformative value I will discuss is encouraging understanding,
which I take to be a practical transformative value of argumentation because
understanding, generally speaking, is often required for individuals to work
together toward common ends, strengthen their own positions, evaluate other’s
arguments better, and construct one’s own arguments better. That said,
understanding itself is a textured concept, and we need to approach it needs to be
approached at a deeper level.
To help us do that, I turn to Catherine Hundleby (2010) who maintains that
argument should “function with epistemic goals in view” (p. 303). Drawing on the
work of Phyllis Rooney, she claims that argument should be more of a “joint venture
of knowledge seeking” than oppositional, “reasoning with” rather than “arguing
against” (p. 302). On this view, it seems that argumentation that encourages
participants to cooperatively resolve differences of opinion and learn together what
the best answer to a dispute may be—thereby strengthening positions on the
matter—is practically valuable. Now, so far as understanding is concerned,
Hundleby sees it emphasized in the work of Walton (1995) who considers “the
employment of argumentative discourse to develop one’s own understanding, a
purpose that he describes as maieutic” (p. 303). In the passage cited by Hundleby,
Walton also claims that “in many cases a critical discussion can be very valuable and
informative even though a definitive resolution of the conflict is not achieved…[It
can have, in part,] the benefit…of increased understanding of the argumentation
behind the opponent’s point of view” (Walton 1995, pp. 102-103). Even when
conflicts are not cooperatively resolved, that is, even if there is a “loser” or no one
“wins” the argument (in the traditional oppositional sense of these terms), then we
might come to understand our interlocutor(s) better. An argumentation theory that
fosters this sort of attitude to approaching argumentative exchange can be, no
doubt, all the more practically valuable.
Hundleby (2010) further remarks that, according to Walton, the maieutic
function of argumentation is, unfortunately, “secondary to the goal of persuasion”
(p. 303). Moreover, Walton (1995) is uncertain about “whether this maieutic
function leads to knowledge or only to a kind of insight or increased understanding
9
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of one’s own personal views and commitments” (p. 103). Interestingly, though, the
latter possibility he identifies might “be a very important kind of benefit or advance
that could prepare the way for knowledge. The advance here could be described as a
kind of negative clearing away of prejudices, bias, dogmatic preconceptions,
fallacies, and so forth that removes important impediments to the advancement of
knowledge” (ibid.). Thus, not only might it be possible to understand others better
through argumentative exchange, we might also come to better understand our own
points of view. Whether it is a better understanding of the other’s position or one’s
own that is gained (or even both), that understanding is made possible by a deeper
understanding of the beliefs and assumptions (i.e. biases) that condition those
positions. Recognizing these undergirding factors would go a long way toward
developing the sort of visibility of one another’s conceptual frameworks advocated
by Warren that we came to appreciate above as valuable for teachers and learners
above.
Furthermore, as arguers and addressees, understanding in the ways just
outlined can be valuable for argument evaluation and construction. If we
understand our own positions better, and in turn what underlies those positions
themselves, as well as others’ positions and the beliefs underlying them, then we
understand more of the argumentative context in which they arise. Greater
contextual understanding is something that aids our ability to more easily and
better evaluate and construct arguments. In the former case, it aids our decisionmaking in determining whether we will accept (or reject) the argument(s) that we
are engaged in. As for the latter case, it cultivates a sensitivity to the sorts of
expectations, interpretations, and responses of audiences. Of course, in keeping with
the views described above, I must emphasize that evaluation and construction are
taken here as part and parcel of the same (dialogical) process of argumentation.
Understanding, then, goes hand-in-hand with openness and one cannot be properly
implemented without the other.
The final transformative value is the facilitation of motivation. I identify it as
transformative because it may assist agents in their deliberative processes and
bolster their movements to action. An argumentation theory that fosters tolerance
and understanding—both practical transformative values themselves—might, for
instance, be involved in affecting our attitudes toward others and move us to treat
others better, or even provide us with expanded and new content to inform
whatever it may be that we are deliberating about (or simply increase the scope of
matters to deliberate about). These can all potentially be involved in motivating
action, and better action, which we are generally obligated to try to do.
In sum, openness and understanding yield a normative thrust which can
encourage motivation. One hopes that it is not too naively optimistic to think that
these three ingredients, when taken together, can potentially coalesce to form a
push toward positive social change.
5. CONCLUSION
After situating my approach to derive some possible practical values of
argumentation theory and practice within a maximal democratic framework, I tried
10
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to illustrate a compatible moral obligation to try to reason and/or argue better,
which can help us more fully appreciate argumentation that facilitates certain
practical values that flow from it. From this basis, I identified a variety of
pedagogical and transformative values of argumentation theory and practice that
could be useful for societies that value the maximal participation of its citizens.
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